Commentary: What will Putin do after deadly Moscow concert hall attack?

BIRMINGHAM, England: The attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall concert venue on Friday (Mar 22) has been the deadliest terrorist incident in two decades, with current estimates of more than 130 people killed and scores more injured.

Apart from the human tragedy of the event, it raises a series of questions about why Russia finds itself in the sights of the Islamic State terror group, how the attack could happen in a country known for its giant internal security apparatus, and how it might affect the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine.

The group that claimed responsibility for the attack is Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K), a branch of the Islamic State terror network which is believed to have its main base in Afghanistan.

There it has emerged as the main adversary to the Taliban and is believed to be relying mostly on ethnic Tajiks to fill its ranks, while also recruiting among nationalities of other Central Asian states, such as Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.

Among these, some were part of the former Northern Alliance that already resisted the Taliban during their first period of rule in Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001, while others were fighters returning from Syria after the defeat of the Islamic State there and in neighbouring Iraq by an international coalition that included Russia.

Moscow’s support for Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, its rapprochement with the Taliban, and a history of repression of Islam inside the country add to a list of grievances that ISIS-K harbours against Russia.

DID RUSSIA NEGLECT ISLAMIC STATE THREAT?

The attack on Crocus City Hall comes just two weeks after US officials said they had warned Russia of intelligence about an “imminent attack” targeting mass gatherings in Moscow, including concerts.

Given that the terror group has been very outspoken in its criticism of Russia and had previously attacked the Russian embassy in Kabul in September 2022, it is surprising that Russian foreign intelligence and domestic security forces were unable to prevent the attack - in contrast to two earlier Islamic State plots in March against a synagogue in Moscow and in the North Caucasus region of Ingushetia.

With a lot of resources of Russia’s main domestic security organisation, the FSB, consumed by monitoring - and suppressing - any political opposition to Vladimir Putin’s regime, it seems likely that the two foiled attacks created a false sense of security, and of its own effectiveness, within the FSB.

A likely heavy focus on ensuring the smooth running of presidential elections the previous weekend will have additionally created a window of opportunity for ISIS-K which the terror group brutally exploited.

The carnage at the Crocus City Hall shows that Russia is clearly unable to cope with such an increased level of Islamic State activity in the country. It casts a shadow not only on the FSB and its ability to protect ordinary Russians from terrorism but it also dents the image of Mr Putin as an omnipotent ruler who has just, certainly in his own view, deservedly secured a fifth term in office.

WILL RUSSIA USE MOSCOW ATTACK TO FURTHER JUSTIFY UKRAINE WAR?

Despite the fact that ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the attack, Mr Putin has so far refused to name the group in any of his public statements. Rather, he has, without providing any evidence, hinted at the involvement of Kyiv, claiming that the four attackers were detained on their way to the Ukrainian border where plans were in place to facilitate their border crossing.

In a tightly controlled media landscape like Russia’s where independent sources of information are almost unavailable to the population, this kind of messaging by the Russian president is important.

It enables the Kremlin’s propaganda machine to link an obvious human tragedy with its war of aggression against its neighbour - adding additional “justification” for the war itself and potentially providing a rationale for further escalation on the battlefield in Ukraine. Perhaps more importantly, it will also make it easier for Mr Putin to consider another wave of mobilisation in Russia and a further tightening of domestic security.

CRACKS IN VLADIMIR PUTIN’S REGIME

Given how ineffective the FSB has appeared to be in preventing an ISIS-K attack against a concert hall just 20km from the Kremlin, clearly not all is well with the very institutions that are meant to keep Putin in power.

It is one thing for attacks to occur thousands of kilometres away in the restive North Caucasus, it is quite another when an international terror group can strike close to the Russian capital and when its victims are predominantly from among the urban elites whose acquiescence, if not support, Mr Putin needs to keep his regime safe.

Regardless of whether, and how, the Russian president will keep playing the Ukrainian card in this tragedy, his inability to uphold his side of a tacit bargain with society - where the regime is not challenged in exchange for providing a certain level of security and living standards - will not have gone unnoticed.

Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham and Head of the Department of Political Science and International Studies.